Introduction
In recent years, there has been a widespread use of off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities in the banking system around the world. The reasons for the rapid growth in bank's OBS exposures have been much debated. Deregulation and technological progress have increased competitive pressures, from banks and non-banking institutions. In turn, this increase in competition have led banks' margins for many types of conventional on-balance-sheet business to diminish, whilst at the same time supervisors have acted to restore and strengthen banks' capital adequacy. This urges bank to seek out non-traditional ways to exploit extraordinary profit opportunities, leading to financial innovation, with OBS being one of the most common types. Offbalance-sheet activities have the potential to generate positive or negative cash flows, and influence the production mix of banks. That is, some OBS are often effective substitutes for directly issued loans requiring similar information-gathering costs of origination (Berger and Mester, 1997) while others are used by banks to hedge risk and to generate income. Furthermore, the proliferation of OBS activities has allowed banks to avoid certain regulatory costs such as minimum reserve, deposit insurance, and capital adequacy requirement. Thus, OBS can influence both bank costs and profits.
It remains an open question, however, whether reorganisation of the production structure of banks will lead to improved performance (Rime and Stiroh, 2003) . Evidence from the bank efficiency literature that provides comparisons of efficiency estimations with and without OBS, suggests that omitting OBS items may result in a misspecification of bank output and lead to incorrect conclusions Stiroh, 2000; Clark and Siems, 2002; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010) .
However, less is known on the effect that the increase in non-traditional activities has on banks' productivity growth (Casu and Girardone, 2005) . For instance, one could easily argue that the mix of on-and off-balance sheet activities will have a substantial impact on productivity, if banks are not equally efficient in engaging in those activities. At the end, if banks are becoming more productive then one might expect better performance, lower prices, improved service quality for consumers, as well as greater safety and soundness (Casu et al. 2004) . Therefore, the relationship between OBS and productivity growth could be of great interest to management, shareholders, as well as for supervisory authorities. 3 This paper contributes to the literature by providing international evidence on the relevance of OBS activities on the estimation of bank productivity change. To the best of our knowledge, up to date only Casu and Girardone (2005) provide similar evidence while focusing on the five largest EU banking sectors. We differentiate our paper from Casu and Girardone (2005) in two very important respects.
First, we proceed to an international comparison using banks from 87 countries that makes our study far more comprehensive in terms of geographical coverage, than all previous cross-country studies on bank productivity (e.g. Pastor et al., 1997; Chaffai et al., 2001; Casu et al., 2004; Casu and Girardone, 2005) . While the developments of financial innovations have spread in the banking system around the world, the pace has being quicker in some countries than others, and it should therefore be interesting to investigate the effect of OBS on banks productivity from a wide international perspective. Furthermore, it is of particular interest that this international setting allows us to perform our analysis in terms of group of countries across different levels of economic development (i.e. major-advanced, advanced, transition and developing). Thus, we can examine whether banks from advanced countries with a longer history and higher volume of involvement in OBS activities are more productive than the ones operating in less developed markets. Additionally, our setting may be helpful in identifying the success or failure of policy-making, since the use of OBS activities may differ due to differences in capital requirements, governmental regulations and so on, increasing the adverse selection and moral hazard problems among countries. For instance, one policy implication, highlighted by is that the increase (decrease) in efficiency indicates that banks tend to be producing and selling non-traditional output better (worse) than traditional output, on average. Therefore, policy makers may want to consider such changes in banks' performance when developing regulations related to restrictions on bank activities.
Second, while Casu and Girardone (2005) focus on technical and technological change we provide estimates of economic productivity in cost and profit and measure the important role for these operations in a bank's economic activity.
The main reason is that OBS activities incorporate cost but they can also increase revenue, so cost productivity alone should not be able to capture some of the benefits of the changes in the product mix of banks due to the development of OBS activities. Therefore, it is essential to derive measures of productivity change in banks' costs and 4 profits. In other words, while the cost productivity controls for the level of outputs and input prices across banks, revealing the managerial attention to cost, the profit productivity gives information about the managerial attention paid to raising marginal revenues as well as to reducing marginal cost.
To calculate the aforementioned productivity measures we follow the parametric approach suggested by Berger and Mester (2003) that was also adopted in Casu et al. (2004) , and Molyneux and Williams (2005) . This approach decomposes total cost and profit changes into a component due to changes in business conditions and a component due to changes in productivity. The latter one is decomposed further into a change in best practice and a change in (in)efficiency. Since our paper addresses an international comparison, we assume that banks from different countries operate in different environments. To control for such differences we use the approach of Battese and Coelli (1995) which allows environmental factors to influence directly the inefficiency term. Besides accounting for differences in the macroeconomic conditions and banking structure as many international banking comparisons suggest (e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2002; Lozano-Vivas et al. 2001 , among others) we also include differences in terms of regulation and supervision among countries. More specifically, we proxy for capital requirements, private monitoring, official disciplinary power and restrictions on banks activities, under the assumption that the impact of the financial innovation instruments (i.e. OBS activities) on the bank production process differs across different regulatory and supervisory systems.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology, data and variables. Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes the study.
Methodology

Productivity measurement from a decomposition of cost (profit) changes
We adopt the methodology of Berger and Mester (2003) to measure cost and profit productivity. The productivity growth is obtained from a decomposition of cost and profit changes. By using cost and profit function estimates, the cost and profit changes over time are decomposed in a proportion due to business conditions changes and another due to productivity changes. Productivity changes are further decomposed into changes in best practice and changes in inefficiency.
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To estimate the cost and profit function we resort to the cost minimization and profit maximization problems. For brevity, we present only the cost minimization problem and the decomposition of cost changes. Therefore, we assume that banks minimize costs subject to exogenously given prices of inputs, quantities of outputs, their own managerial inefficiency, and a random error. Consequently, we define and estimate a standard cost function that relates cost with those conditions. The use of the cost estimations in the calculation of the cost changes requires the definition and estimation of one cost function for each year as follows:
where:
, is the total cost of bank i at year t;
is the best practice cost function;
is a set of exogenous business conditions that affect cost, particularly quantity of outputs (given in logged terms by the vector q) and price of inputs (given in logged terms by the vector w);  is a vector of unknown scalar parameters to be estimated; corresponds to the average value of the inefficiency factor. Following Berger and Mester (2003) the total gross change in cost between period t and t+k is obtained by the ratio of the predicted costs in the two periods as follows:
Where, the total gross change in cost ( TOTALc  )can be decomposed further into the gross changes productivity (gross changes in best practice, and in inefficiency), and business conditions as follows:
Furthermore, the cost productivity change, 
). Thus, the changes in productivity can be decomposed into changes in best-practice and changes in inefficiency as follow (4) Consequently, the change in costs is disaggregated into three multiplicative components. The change in best practice, All these terms are measured as gross changes.
For the measurement of profit productivity, consistent with studies on bank efficiency, we use the alternative profit function. 1 Thus, although the alternative profit 1 Berger and Mester (1997) argue that alternative profit efficiency may provide useful information and be preferred when one or more of the following conditions are applicable: (a) there are substantial unmeasured differences in the quality of banking services; (b) outputs are not completely variable; (c) output markets are not perfectly competitive; (d) output prices are not accurately measured. Based on these arguments, Kasman and Yildirim (2006) point out that in international comparisons with a 
function has the same objective as the standard profit maximization concept (i.e. it assumes that firms maximize profits subjects to exogenous business conditions), it is specified under the same set of business conditions with the cost minimization problem. Consequently, the decomposition of profit changes will be equal to that of cost changes, the only difference being in equation (1) ln .
Methodology implementation
In view of the fact that our goal is to analyse the effect of the involvement in non-traditional activities on banks' productivity growth we estimate the cost and profit functions with and without non-traditional activities. For the selection of inputs and outputs, we follow the intermediation approach which assumes that banks act as intermediates that collect purchased funds and use labour and physical capital to transform these funds into loans and other assets. Thus, we estimate two versions of our model. Model 1 assumes that banks have two outputs, namely loans (Q1) and other earning assets (Q2). Model 2 is identical to Model 1 but OBS activities (Q3) are used as an additional output that captures non-traditional activities. In each case, we obtain estimates for both costs and profits so we have four models in total. Model C1
and Model C2 correspond to costs functions whereas Model P1 and Model P2 correspond to profits functions.
In all the cases, we use three input prices. Consistent with most previous studies these are: cost of borrowed funds (W1), calculated as the ratio of interest expenses to customer deposits and short term funding; cost of physical capital (W2), calculated by dividing overhead expenses other than personnel expenses by the book value of fixed assets; and cost of labour (W3), calculated by dividing the personnel expenses by total assets 2 . To impose linear homogeneity restrictions we normalize the dependent variable and all input prices by W3.
Following Berger and Mester (1997) among others, we use equity to control for differences in risk preferences. One of the reasons is that while some of the OBS diverse group of countries and competition levels it seems more appropriate to estimate an alternative rather than a standard profit function. Furthermore, DeYoung and Hasan (1998) point out that output quantities tend to vary across banks to a greater extent than input prices, thus explaining a larger portion of the variation in profits in regression analysis. 2 In calculating W3, we use total assets rather than the number of employees due to data unavailability. Our approach is consistent with several other studies (e.g. Altubas et al., 2001) .
8 instruments lead to risk reduction, others increase the risk exposure of the commercial banks. So, the OBS activities not only enable higher profits, but they also expose banks to additional risks. As in Berger and Mester (2003) , our specification is estimated separately for each year. Thus, using the multi-product translog specification 3 , Equation (3) in the case of Model 2C becomes 4 :
We estimate the cost and profit functions using stochastic frontier analysis.
More precisely, as mentioned in the introduction, we use the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification that allow us to control for country-specific attributes in a single stage during the estimation of efficiency. Thus, following Battese and Coelli (1995) ,
in the above specification are random errors, assumed to be i.i.d. and have
are the non-negative inefficiency effects in the model which are assumed to be independently (but not identically) distributed, such that 3 Some other studies rely on the Fourier Flexible (FF) specification to estimate efficiency (e.g. DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). Berger and Mester (1997) found that both the translog and the FF function form yielded essentially the same average level and dispersion of measure efficiency, and both ranked the individual banks in almost the same order. However, Altunbas and Chakravarty (2001) compare the FF and translog specifications and urge caution about the growing use of the former to investigate bank efficiency. We therefore use the translog specification as in several other recent studies (e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Fries and Taci , 2005) . 4 For brevity of space, we present only one of the models. In the case of Model 2P one has to replace TC with PBT and change the sign of the inefficiency term. In the case of Models C1 and P1, one has to drop Q3 from the specification. 
where t i z , is a ) 1 ( xM vector of observable explanatory variables that influence the inefficiency of bank i at time t; and  is an ) 1 (Mx vector of coefficients to be estimated (which would generally be expected to included an intercept parameter). In the case of profit efficiency, equations (5) and (6) are estimated taking profit before taxes (PBT) as the variable to be explained. As mentioned before, since we estimate an alternative profit function, the specification of the profit frontier model is the same as that of the cost frontier (equation (5)) with PBT replacing TC as the dependent variable.
5 However, the sign of the inefficiency term now becomes negative (-u it ). The parameters of equations (5) and (6) are estimated in one step using maximum likelihood. 6 The individual bank cost and profit (in)efficiency scores are calculated from the estimated frontiers as CE kt = exp(u i ) and PEF kt = exp(-u i ) respectively. The former takes a value between one and infinity and the latter, between zero and one, whereas in both cases, values closer to one indicate higher efficiency.
To control for country-specific environmental factors such as macroeconomic conditions, activity, and concentration in the banking sector, regulatory conditions, and overall development, it m in Equation (6) is defined by:
where INF is the annual rate of inflation and GDPGR is the real GDP growth, both capturing macroeconomic conditions. We control for inflation because Kasman and
Yildirim (2006) PBT over all banks in the sample. 6 See Battese and Coelli (1995) and Coelli et al. (2005) , for further details. 
CLAIMS measures the activity in the banking sector and it is calculated by dividing the bank claims to the private sector with GDP. Higher values of CLAIMS imply higher banking activity due to the increase of loans, and can result in higher efficiency. CONC is the concentration in the banking sector, as measured by the proportion of total assets held by the three largest banks in the country. Under Hicks (1935) quite life hypothesis, higher concentration could result in less efficient banks.
However, under the efficient structure hypothesis, higher concentration could be the result of greater efficiency in the production process (Demsetz, 1973) .
CAPRQ, SPOWER, PRMON and RESTR are variables that control for the main regulatory conditions in each country's banking industry. CAPRQ is a measure of capital requirements that accounts for both initial and overall capital stringency. 7 As discussed in Delis et al. (2008) capital requirements can influence bank productivity due to several reasons: (i) changes in the volume of aggregate lending and loan quality, (ii) changes in the portfolio of assets which result in different returns, and (iii) changes in the mix of deposits and equity, which bear different costs.
SPOWER is a measure of the power of the supervisory agencies indicating the information that is communicated to the supervisors (including OBS disclosures) and the extent to which they can take specific actions against bank management and directors, shareholders, and bank auditors. SPOWER could had either a positive or a negative impact on productivity depending on whether powerful supervisors improve the corporate governance of banks, reduce corruption in bank lending, and improve the functioning of banks as financial intermediaries or whether they are related to corruption or other factors that impede bank operations (Delis et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2006) .
PRMON is an indicator of private monitoring and shows the degree to which banks are forced to disclose accurate information to the public (including OBS) and whether there are incentives to increase private monitoring. Under a market discipline perspective, we would expect that enhanced private monitoring would boost the functioning of banks (Barth et al., 2007) and their productivity. by zero values in all three dummy variables.
Data
We initially considered the population of publicly quoted commercial banks that appeared to have financial records in Bankscope. After excluding banks that: (i) had missing, negative or zero values for inputs/outputs, and (ii) had missing values in the case of the country-specific control variables, we obtained a sample of 4,960 observations from 752 banks operating in 87 countries during [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] 8 .
We collected information from various sources. All bank-specific data were obtained from Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk and were converted to US dollars and in real terms using GDP deflators. Information on bank regulations and supervision (i.e. CAPRQ, PRMON, SPOWER, RESTR) is obtained by the World Bank (WB) database developed by Barth et al. (2001) and updated by Barth et al. (2006, 8 We focus on publicly quoted banks because as mentioned in Laeven and Levine (2006) it enhances comparability across countries. Furthermore, we focus on commercial banks for two reasons. First, because it allows us to examine a more homogenous sample in terms of services, and consequently inputs and outputs, enhancing further the comparability among countries. Second, as mentioned in Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) , since the regulatory data of the Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008) database are for commercial banks, it is more appropriate to use bank-level data only for this type of banks.
12 2008) 9 . Data for concentration (i.e. CONC) are collected from the updated version of the WB database on financial development and structure (Beck et al., 2006b [Insert Tables 1 and 2 Around Here]
Results
In this section we present the results on cost and profit productivity growth. First, we discuss the overall effect of OBS on those two types of productivity. Then, we examine whether and how this effect differs across different levels of economic development. Table 3 presents the results for the cost (Panels A and B) and profit (Panels C and D) models. We report the total changes in costs (profits) over time (ΔTOTAL) and the decomposition of these total changes into their cost (profit) productivity change 9 This WB database is available in only three points in time. Version I was released in 2001 (Barth et al., 2001) . For most of the countries, information corresponds to 1999, while for others information is either from 1998 or 2000. Version II describes the regulatory environment at the end of 2002 (Barth et al., 2006 [Insert Table 3 Around Here]
Overall cost and profit productivity growth with and without OBS
Looking at Panel A, the ΔTOTAL C figure shows that over the entire period 1999-2006 the cost of the average bank rose by 9%. Using the average-practice cost function to decompose the costs changes we observe that the increase in costs is due to changes in business conditions rather than cost productivity. More precisely, the results show that cost productivity improved by 0.21% over 1999-2006 however changes in business conditions increased costs by 9.23%. Decomposing ΔPROD C further, we observe a favourable shift in the best practise (0.34%) and a slight increase in inefficiency (0.12%). The inclusion of OBS as an additional output in the cost function returns an overall similar picture. ΔTOTAL C now equals 9.19% showing that OBS activities increase the costs of banks further. While the negative impact of change in business conditions is slightly lower than in Model C1, productivity change also contributes now to the increase of costs in Model C2. However, differently than the case where OBS activities are not included, we observe a negative shift in the best practise (0.31%) and a slight decrease in inefficiency (0.21%). Overall, the comparison of the cost models shows that the impact of OBS on productivity is negative, which is explained by the adverse shift in the best practice cost that outperforms the positive contribution of inefficiency changes on cost productivity.
Turning to Model P1, we observe that when we do not account for OBS, the profits of the average bank seem to decrease by 0.49%. In this case, changes in business conditions have a positive impact on profits (0.37%) which is however counterbalance by the negative impact of profit productivity change (0.86%). The latter is due to an adverse shift in best practice which offsets the increase in efficiency. When we include OBS in the profit function (Model P2), we observe that there are important differences from Model P1. More detailed, the results now indicate an improvement in all the measures. The ΔTOTAL Π figure shows that the profits of the average bank increase by 3.94%. As before, profit productivity change exercises a higher influence (3.42%) than business conditions' change (0.37%) on 14 profits, however both figures have now a favourable impact. The change in efficiency is now only 0.43% compared to 4.04% in the case of Model P1; however, the change in best practice becomes now favourable (2.98%), resulting in an improvement in profit productivity that is equal to 3.42%.
Therefore, it seems that as banks offer a wider range of services, and more specifically as they engage in OBS, they experience an increase in costs. However, this increase in costs can be perceived as a perquisite in offering additional and higher quality services to bank customers, eventually resulting in higher profits. Overall, our results are consistent with this hypothesis and provide support to the arguments of Berger and Mester (2003) . Moreover, it seems that OBS activities have a large and positive effect on profit productivity and a small negative effect on cost productivity.
Interesting enough is that the decomposition of productivity illustrates that OBS activities improve (worsen) cost (profit) efficiency and worsen (improve) best practice cost (profit). Those results suggest that while OBS activities exercise a favourable (unfavourable) shift in profit (cost) frontier, they increase (decrease) the divergences of banks with respect the best practice profit (cost) frontier. In order words, it seems that OBS activities increase profit technological change but the diffusion of this progress among banks is small. The opposite is true for the case of cost.
[Insert Table 4 Around Here]
Cost and profit productivity growth with and without OBS by country with different levels of economic development
We turn now our attention to the main goal of our paper that is the investigation of the effect of OBS on banks productivity across various groups of countries on the basis on their level of economic development. Table 4 presents the disaggregating of our measures by level of development. 10 The results from both cost models indicate that ΔTOTALc worsens in all cases. However, there are important differences between the four groups, while the influence of the OBS also differs across the groups. For instance, the results from Model C1 indicate that the change in the cost of the average bank varies between 1.98% in advanced countries to 14.11% in transition countries.
However, when we consider OBS (Model C2) we observe a boost in the change of costs in advanced countries reaching 11.60%. Model C2 provides more favourable results for all the groups of countries except for advanced countries. More detailed, the change in total costs is now equal to 4.49% for major-advanced countries (compared to 9.62% in Model C1), 12.32% for transition countries (14.11% in Model C1) and 5.86% for developing countries (7.22% in Model C1).
As before the decomposition into cost productivity growth and changes in business conditions shows that it is the latter that drives our results. although it contradicts Berger and Mester (2003) who report that business conditions put downward pressures on the costs of U.S. banks. The difference between our study and the one of Berger and Mester can be most likely attributed to our cross-country setting and the business conditions that we consider. However, we believe that the increase in costs due to changes in business conditions is not surprising over the period that we examine. Barth et al. (2008) show that between 1999 and 2006 most countries have empowered the banking environment conditions. The fact that transition countries are the ones that were the most heavily influence by the changes in business conditions is also not surprising. These countries experienced fundamental changes in recent years such as restructuring and privatisation of state banks, policies 11 This also means that the changes in costs due to a shift in best practise and inefficiency changes are also small and there are only marginal differences across the two models and the various groups. Probably the most notable difference between the two models is observed in the case of inefficiency change for transition countries which equals 1.130 in the case of Model C1 and 0.9872 in the case of Model C2. In contrast, banks in developing-emerging countries experience an adverse shift in best practice from 0.9952 in Model C1 to 1.0032 in Model C2.
to promote the transformation of socialist banking systems to market oriented ones, introduction of and changes in prudential regulation and supervision, transfer of technology and know-how (Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005a,b) . Obviously, these changes have altered the environment that banks operate and posed many challenges to managers.
Overall, the introduction of OBS improves cost productivity in two out of the four cases. More detailed, banks in advanced and developing countries experience a decrease in productivity in contrast to the improvement that it is recorded in the case of major-advanced and transition countries. Further decomposition, illustrates that the advance in productivity is basically due to an improvement in inefficiency changes,
i.e. OBS activities enhance efficiency in all the group of countries, with the exception of developing countries where efficiency slightly worsens. The most favoured countries are the transition ones, which record a major improvement in cost efficiency, making them the ones with the highest improvement in cost productivity.
On the other hand, we observe a deterioration of best practice in all the groups of countries, with the exception of major-advanced ones which improve best practice as well as cost efficiency.
Turning to Model P1 (Panel C), the results are mixed as we observe that total profits (ΔTOTAL π ) for the average bank in major-advanced (2.30%) and advanced countries (1.35%) increase; however, the average bank in transition and developing countries experiences a decrease by 0.58% and 2.63%, respectively. In contrast to the cost models we now observe that profit productivity change rather than the change in business conditions, is the main driver of the total profits change. The only exception is the group of advanced countries where business conditions increase profits by 3.64% despite the adverse effect of productivity by 2.21%. The decomposition of ΔPROD π shows a positive change in efficiency and a negative change in best practice in all cases. Furthermore, while the changes in efficiency do not vary much between the four groups, the variation is much higher in the case of the change in best practice.
It ranges from -0.23% in major-advanced countries to -7.62% in transition countries.
The inclusion of OBS in the model alters significantly the picture. ΔTOTAL π increases in all cases and it now ranges between 2.09% (developing) and 10.71% (transition).
Productivity change is now positive and it influences profits more than business conditions in two (major-advanced, developing) out of the four cases.
Overall, it seems that OBS activities improve profit productivity for all the groups of countries, with the highest improvement being recorded in the case of developing countries followed by transitory, advanced and major-advanced countries.
However, the major-advanced countries are in both cases (i.e. with and without OBS) the ones with the highest level of profit productivity. Inversely to the case of cost, the improvement in profit productivity, once OBS is taking into account, is due to an advance in best practice (for all the groups of countries), and not to improvements in inefficiency. The highest improvement in best practice is recorded in advanced countries; however, the major-advanced countries experience again the highest level of changes in best practice. On the other hand, there exists a deterioration of profit efficiency in all the groups of countries when OBS is introduced as an additional output, with the highest deterioration being recorded in the case of advanced and transition countries.
Taking together our results on cost and profit productivity it seems that majoradvanced and transition countries are the only two groups of countries that are influenced positively by OBS in terms of both cost as well as profit productivity.
Moreover, while OBS activities improve cost efficiency for all groups of countries (except for developing ones), they worsen profit efficiency for all the groups of countries. Overall, the results suggest that OBS incorporate a better diffusion of technology among banks for cost than for profit. On the other hand, while OBS worsen best practice cost for all categories of countries (except for major-advanced ones), it improve best practice profit. That means that OBS shift upwards the profit frontier and downwards the cost frontier, i.e. OBS exercise technological profit progress and cost regress.
Conclusions
Over the last years, commercial banks have engaged in non-lending activities and as a result OBS items such as credit lines, contingent liabilities and other commitments represent now a large proportion of the balance sheets in most banking sectors.
However, it is still unclear whether this reorganisation of the production structure improves or worsens the productivity of banks. This study used a sample of 4,960
observations from 752 banks operating in 87 countries to calculate productivity changes with and without OBS during 1999-2006. The productivity changes were 18 obtained through the parametric decomposition approach suggested by Berger and Mester (2003) , while to control for cross-country specific characteristics the cost and profit frontiers were estimated using the Battese and Coelli (1995) model.
We found that the cost of the average bank rose by 9% over the period of our study, while the inclusion of OBS in the model increased this figure to 9.19%. Using the average-practice cost function to decompose the costs changes we observed that not matter which model was considered, the increase in costs was due to changes in business conditions rather than cost productivity. As it concerns profit, when we did not account for OBS, the profits of the average bank appeared to decrease by 0.49%.
However, the inclusion of OBS in the model altered the picture and we observed an improvement in almost all the components, resulting in a positive change of total profits by 3.94%. In contrast to the cost model, it was profit productivity rather than the change in business conditions that drove the results. Overall, one could argue that as banks engaged in OBS activities they experienced an increase in their costs which was however counterbalanced by the generation of additional revenues, resulting in higher profits.
When we disaggregated our measures by level of development, we observed that, as before, total cost increased in all cases. However, there were important differences between the four groups, while the influence of the OBS also differed across the groups. The transition countries were the most heavily influenced ones by the changes in business condition, an observation that could be related to the fundamental changes that they experienced in recent years. In the case of the profit models, the results were mixed. Without accounting for OBS, we observed an increase in the total profits in the groups of major-advanced and advanced countries, and a decrease in the case of transition and developing countries. As before profit productivity change rather than the change in business conditions, was the main driver of the total profits change. However, once we included OBS in the model, the total profit change became positive in all cases. Furthermore, we observed changes as for the impact of productivity change and the shift in the influence of the change in the best practice. Finally, profit productivity change was more important than the change in business conditions in major-advanced and developing countries, while in the remaining two groups we observed the opposite. Overall, the results suggest that while the developments of financial innovations have spread in the banking systems around the world, the impact on productivity differs among groups of countries.
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Banks in major-advanced countries and countries in transition were the ones that favoured the most by their involvement in OBS activities, since they experienced an improvement in cost as well as profit productivity. As it concerns the advanced and developing countries, their involvement in OBS activities increased costs, resulting in a worsening of the cost productivity measures; however, at the same time they experienced a higher increase in revenues leading to an improvement in the profit productivity measures.
To conclude, our paper makes an important contribution in the appraisal of bank productivity by offering international evidence on the possible effects of the use of OBS activities on productivity. We are therefore able to provide insights with regards to the benefits that changes in the product mix of banks have on productivity as well as to make comparisons between cost and profit productivity. Notes: Models C1 (cost) and P1 (profits) assume that banks have two outputs namely loans and other earning assets. Models C2 and P2 assume that banks have three outputs namely loans, other earning assets, off-balance sheet items; ∆TOTAL = total change, ∆PROD = productivity change, ∆BUSCOND = business conditions change, ∆BESTPR = best-practice frontier change, ∆INEFF = inefficiency change; ∆EFF = efficiency change. A number higher than one indicates rising costs (profits) and a number lower than one indicates falling costs (profits). Notes: Models C1 (cost) and P1 (profits) assume that banks have two outputs namely loans and other earning assets. Models C2 and P2 assume that banks have three outputs namely loans, other earning assets, off-balance sheet items; ∆TOTAL = total change, ∆PROD = productivity change, ∆BUSCOND = business conditions change, ∆BESTPR = best-practice frontier change, ∆INEFF = inefficiency change; ∆EFF = efficiency change. A number higher than one indicates rising costs (profits) and a number lower than indicates falling costs (profits).
